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ALBA AND UNASUR:
BACK TO THE FUTURE?
By Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr.*
Abstract
This essay discusses efforts at creating a unified Latin American region through
the lens of different integration attempts. Part I briefly examines MERCOSUR and
the Andean Group and how these two efforts failed to achieve promises made under
the free trade model that grew under the Washington Consensus. Structural
problems and changing political tides left these two groups unsuccessful, and
ultimately the election of populist leftwing presidents in Argentina, Brazil, and
Venezuela ushered in a new model of integration intended to increase the economic
development of Latin America in an equitable fashion. Despite their different
ideologies and missions, both Alianza Bolivariana de las Américas (“ALBA”) and
Unión Suramericana de Naciones or Union of South American Nations
(“UNASUR”) shared much with their predecessors. Part II describes the first of
these new efforts, ALBA, tracing its history, development, organizational structure,
institutions, grannational enterprises, and bank, creating a picture of ALBA’s
failure over time. ALBA sought the transformation of Latin American societies,
making them more just, participative, and united, through the enactment of various
principles and a general framework. The essay also explains the ways ALBA
leadership attempted to refine goals over time with little success. This section
includes a discussion of PETROCARIBE, an agreement signed at a summit of
Caribbean nations, and how this treaty diluted ALBA’s goals. Part III examines
UNASUR tracing its origins, mission, organizational structure, institutions, and
specialized councils. UNASUR was modeled after the European Union and sought
to establish full economic, political, and monetary unity in South America. This
section outlines several issues that prevented UNASUR from achieving its goals,
such as differing political agendas amongst member states and major structural
issues, to show how UNASUR, like ALBA, ultimately failed its mission. In
particular, this section explicates the various councils enacted by UNASUR and
reveals how their structure and lack of institutional framework made them
ineffective. Part IV concludes that the failures of both ALBA and UNASUR to
achieve their goals or even to survive underscores several important lessons for
integration organizations.

* Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I thank my research
assistant, Allegra Abramson, Temple Law ’23, for her invaluable assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a desire to create a unified Latin America region since its
countries achieved independence in the early 19th century.1 Unfortunately, serious
thought was not given to the accomplishment of this regionalism goal until the end
of World War II.2 Since then, various regional integration institutions have been
created, all based on the concept that regional integration would bring forth
economic development, progress, prosperity, and union. Their models have tended
to be based on the current popular economic development ideologies and concepts
in vogue at the time of their creation.3
The regional organizations that arose as a result of these efforts can be
described and classified by their founding ideologies. The import substitution
model of development, for example, postulated that economic development of
Latin America’s economies could only be achieved through a government-led
process of internal industrialization and the development of regional markets. 4
Until they were developed enough to compete in international markets, these infant
industries would have to be protected from extra-regional competition through
regulation, which essentially closed off foreign competition, limited the export of
capital, and facilitated the acquisition of foreign technology.5 The agendas of
Andean Community and the Latin American Free Trade Association clearly reflect
this model.6
After the failure of the import substitution model to fulfill its economic
policies, most Latin American countries abandoned it in the 1980s and replaced it
with its complete opposite: the so-called Washington Consensus. Under the
Washington Consensus, the state halted all attempts to serve as the principal engine
of economic development and adopted a free trade model, where unregulated free
trade, and not protectionist import and export regulations, were to be the engine of
1

Letter from Simón Bolívar (Sept. 6, 1815),
http://alianzabolivariana.org/ver_antecedente_alba.php?id=6; Joel D. Hirst, A Guide to ALBA:
What is the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas and What Does it Do?, AM. Q.,
https://www.americasquarterly.org//hirst/article.
2
Nicola Bilotta, The Legacy of Post-Neoliberal Integration in South America: The Cases of ALBA
and UNASUR, 18 ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI 1, 4 (2018),
http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep19681; Ken Cole, Progress Into the 21st Century: The
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, 3 INT’L J. OF CUBAN STUD. 116, 3 (2011)
[hereinafter Cole - Progress]; José Gerson Revanales Monsalve, Estructura Morfológica del
ALBA: Ni el ALBA ni el ALCA son Esquemas de Integración, 23 ANUARIO DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 437, 438 (2007).
3
Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Economic Paradigms and Latin American Development Theory: The
Search for Nirvana, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 51 (2006).
4
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, The Economic Development of Latin
America and its Principal Problems (New York, 1950) at 8 (hereinafter “ECLA Report”) at 8-18,
37.
5
Id. at 6, 47, 54, 56-57.
6
Rafael Porrata-Doria, MERCOSUR: THE COMMON MARKET OF THE SOUTHERN CONE 7 (2005)
[hereinafter MERCOSUR].
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economic development.7 Accordingly, some existing regional integration
organizations, like the Andean Group, completely changed their mission and
methodology in order to implement this new model. 8 Others, such as the
Asosciación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI), went out of existence and
were replaced.9 This era also gave rise to a new regional integration association
based on a free-market ideology: Mercado Común del Sur ("MERCOSUR"). 10
At first, the free trade model seemed to be highly successful, and both
MERCOSUR and the re-formed Andean Community made progress.
Unfortunately, however, this free trade model did not achieve its promises either.
By the beginning of the current century, great discontent arose with the Washington
Consensus model. After the effects of the worldwide economic crisis of 2008 were
felt in Latin America, it was discredited and abandoned.11 Unregulated free trade
was no longer popular. Both MERCOSUR and the Andean Community found
themselves in the doldrums, with their integration agendas and projects
considerably slowed down or abandoned altogether. 12 As I have described
elsewhere, both MERCOSUR and the Andean Community had structural problems
which, regardless of which ideological agenda they followed, would prevent them
from advancing their missions.13 The new populist left-wing presidents who were
elected in Argentina,14 Brazil,15 and Venezuela16 advocated for a new model of
integration which would increase the economic development of Latin America in
an equitable fashion.
This advocacy resulted in the creation of two new regional integration
organizations. As we shall see below, the first, the Alianza Bolivariana de las
7

JOHN WILLIAMSON, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN
ADJUSTMENT; HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? (Washington, DC 1990) at 7-15.
8
Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, TRANSPLANTING INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE LAW AND
POLITICS OF THE ANDEAN TRIBUNAL OF JUSTICE (2017).
9
MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 14.
10
MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 23; Hirst, supra note 1.
11
Helen Yaffe, The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas: An Alternative Development Strategy, 3
INT’L J. OF CUBAN STUD. 128, 128 (2011); Hirst, supra note 1.
12
Hirst, supra note 1.
13
See Rafael Porrata-Doria, MERCOSUR at Twenty: From Adolescence to Adulthood?, 27
TEMPLE INT.’L & COMP. L. J. 1 (2013).
14
Néstor Krishner was president of Argentina from May 25, 2003 – December 10, 2007. He was
often labeled as a left-wing progressive, and considered himself a Peronist, after the Argentine
political movement based on the legacy of Argentine ruler Juan Perón.
15
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was president of Brazil from January 1, 2003 – December 31, 2010.
He introduced sweeping social programs aimed at elevating the station of Brazil’s working class
and quelling poverty.
16
Hugo Chávez was president of Venezuela from February 2, 1999, to his death on March 5, 2013
(except a brief period in 2002 due to a coup). His political ideology changed throughout his
tenure; by the end of his presidency, he championed what he called “socialism for the 21 st
century.” Chávez identified as Bolivarian, referring to the ideology of 19th-century South
American independence leader Simón Bolívar.
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Américas (“ALBA”) sought to return to a model of state-managed economic
development, albeit with a socialist twist.17 The second organization, the Unión
Suramericana de Naciones (“UNASUR”) was not primarily formed as a trade
harmonization entity and did not appear to be aligned with any particular theory or
model of economic development. Instead, it attempted to create a political, social,
and economic union of all the nations of the South American continent. 18As we
shall see, despite their different ideologies and missions, both ALBA and UNASUR
shared much with their predecessors.
Both organizations failed to achieve their goals. ALBA remains in existence
but is a shadow of its former self and inoperative. 19 UNASUR has essentially been
dissolved.20 As we evaluate ALBA and UNASUR, we will see that the same
structural defects that plagued MERCOSUR and the Andean Community
contributed to their failure to achieve their goals and eventual demise.
In this work, I will examine and evaluate the rise and fall of both ALBA
and UNASUR. In Part II, I will first consider ALBA’s history and development as
well as its mission, organization, and institution. I will then consider its
achievements, flaws, and ultimate failure. In Part III, I will similarly examine and
evaluate UNASUR, starting with its origin, organization, structure, and institutions,
and concluding with its achievements, challenges, and de facto dissolution. In Part
IV, I will evaluate ALBA and UNASUR in the context of other Latin American
trade integration organizations.
I.

ALBA: POPULIST INTEGRATION?
A. ALBA’s History and Development

The ideological concept which became the basis for ALBA appears to have
originated in a speech given by Cuban leader Fidel Castro in 1997. In that speech,
he asserted that the current neoliberal model of economic development and
infrastructure was merely a new confirmation of the profound economic
exploitation and resulting inequalities within the lesser developed countries of Latin
America.21 In order to quell this exploitation and inequality, the current neoliberal
system had to be eliminated and replaced by a new order based on justice and

17

See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
19
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
20
See discussion infra Section III.E.
21
Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, Discurso Pronunciado Por El Comandante En Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz,
Primer Secretario Pel Comite Central Del Partido Comunista De Cuba, Presidente De Los
Consejos De Estado Y De Ministros Y Presidente Del Movimiento De Paises No Alineados, Ante
El Xxxiv Periodo De Sesiones De La Asamblea General De Las Naciones Unidas, Efectuado En
Nueva York, El 12 De Octubre De 1979, “Año 20 De La Victoria” (Oct. 12, 1979) [hereinafter
Castro speech].
18
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peace.22 This required structural economic change from individual nations, which
had to be based on mutual assistance and collaboration among the lesser developed
countries through equitable economic relationships and mutual technical
assistance.23 This was the case because real economic development and progress,
according to Castro, was based on the development of human beings rather than on
trade or commerce.24
The first step in the implementation of Castro’s vision was an economic
cooperation agreement entered into between Cuba and Venezuela in the year
2000.25 In this document, the parties agreed to a program of economic interchange
based on solidarity, as well as the most beneficial exchange of goods and services
in a way that best suited their economic and social needs.26 The agreement further
provided that joint activities could take the form of mixed enterprises, cooperative
production agreements, jointly administered projects, and other forms of
association. Specifically, the agreement allowed for Venezuela to provide Cuba
with crude oil at a reduced price and with technical assistance. In exchange, Cuba
would provide Venezuela with medical personnel.27
B. ALBA’s Organization, Structure, and Institutions
Instead of one single constituent agreement, ALBA and its associated
Peoples’ Free Trade Agreement had a series of declarations, plans, and institutions
which were created to serve as a general framework for its operations. Accordingly,
in order to understand ALBA, one must look at its general organization and the
various institutions created under its umbrella.
1. ALBA’s Formation
The first formalization of ALBA as an organization took place in a joint
declaration by Cuba and Venezuela at the end of a 2004 summit meeting between
its leaders (“2004 Declaration”). This declaration established ALBA as an
integration organization seeking the maximum solidarity of Latin American and
Caribbean countries. ALBA was defined as an organization whose objective was
neither mercantilist nor profit-driven. Rather, it sought the transformation of Latin
American societies, making them more just, participative, and united. This
objective would be achieved through an integration process meant to ensure the
22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Acuerdo entre el Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y el Presidente del
Consejo de Estado de Cuba, Para la Aplicación de la Alternativa Bolivariana de las Américas,
Cuba-Venez., Oct. 30, 2000 [hereinafter Cooperation Agreement, Cuba-Venez].
26
Cooperation Agreement, Cuba-Venez, supra note 25, at art. 2; Larry Catá Backer & Augusto
Molina, Cuba and the Construction of Alternative Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in
the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. OF INT’L L. 679, 698 (2010).
27
Cooperation Agreement, Cuba-Venez, supra note 25, at art. 12.
23
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elimination of social inequalities and improve the quality of life and independence
of its members. Program goals would be attained through the application of twelve
specific cardinal principles.28 The declaration also identified several educational
projects that would be undertaken on behalf of ALBA by mixed transnational
enterprises.29
The 2004 Declaration presented many ambitious goals but did not specify
how these goals were to be achieved, nor did it create an organizational structure
that would be charged with implementing these goals.
A second declaration, which followed a 2006 summit (“2006 Declaration”),
repeated the goals and principles of the 2004 Declaration and mentioned plans to
provide a structure for ALBA and to create a “People’s Commerce Treaty”
(“TCP”). Most of the document is dedicated to the delineation of specific covenants
involving Bolivia, who had agreed to join ALBA at that summit.30
After the 2006 Declaration, a number of other Latin American nations
joined Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia as members of ALBA. Specifically,
Nicaragua joined ALBA in 2007; Dominica joined in 2008; and Ecuador, Surinam,
Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua joined in 2009. 31
2. ALBA’s Structure
ALBA’s members entered into an agreement in 2009 to create a structure
for the organization (“2009 Organization Agreement”). 32 The 2009 Organization
Agreement delineated a rather large and complex organizational structure. This
28

Declaración Conjunta Venezuela, Cuba-Venez., Dec. 14, 2004,
https://www.albatcp.org/acta/declaracion-conjunta-venezuela-cuba/ [hereinafter 2004
Declaration].
29
2004 Declaration, supra note 28.
30
Acuerdo para la Aplicación de la Alternativa Bolivariana para Lo Pueblos de Nuestra América
y el Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos, Bol. – Cuba – Venez., Apr. 29, 2006 [hereinafter 2006
Declaration].
31
Adhesión de Nicaragua al ALBA, Bol.- Cuba- Nicar.- Venez., Jan. 11, 2007,
https://www.albatcp.org/acta/adhesion-de-nicaragua-al-alba/; Adhesión de Honduras al ALBA,
Bol.- Cuba- Dominica -Hond.- Nicar.- Venez., Aug. 25, 2008,
https://www.albatcp.org/acta/adhesion-de-la-republica-de-honduras-al-alba/; Adhesión del
Gobierno de la Mancomunidad de Dominica a la Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de
Nuestra América (ALBA), Bol. – Cuba – Dominica – Nicar.- Venez., Jan. 26, 2008,
https://www.albatcp.org/acta/adhesion-del-gobierno-de-la-mancomunidad-de-dominica-a-laalternativa-bolivariana-para-los-pueblos-de-nuestra-america-alba/; Adhesión de Ecuador al ALBA,
Bol.- Cuba – Dominica – Ecuador - Hond.- St. Vincent.- Venez., June 24, 2009,
https://www.albatcp.org/acta/adhesion-de-ecuador-al-alba/; Adhesión de San Vicente y las
Granadinas al ALBA, Bol.- Cuba – Dominica – Ecuador - Hond.- St. Vincent.- Venez., June 24,
2009, https://www.albatcp.org/acta/adhesion-de-san-vicente-y-las-granadinas-al-alba.
32
ALBA-TCP, Estructura y Funcionamiento del ALBA-TCP,
https://www.albatcp.org/acta/estructura-y-funcionamiento-alba [hereinafter 2009 Organizational
Agreement].
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structure was headed by a Council of Presidents, composed of the heads of state of
each of the member states, which had the absolute power to make all decisions on
behalf of ALBA.33 The Council of Presidents was to be supported by a number of
Councils. Some were composed of specialized state officials, and their principal
role seemed to involve the evaluation of data and the making of recommendations
to the Council of Presidents on their areas of expertise. 34 Other Councils had
broader membership. Of these, all but one seemed to have exclusively analytical
roles.35 The fifth, named the Council of Social Movements, was different. It was to
be formed of representatives of the various social movements present in the
member states. Unlike the other Councils, the Council of Social Movements had
the right to create its own initiatives (rather than just recommending courses of
action) to the Council of Presidents for action. 36 In addition to the Councils, four
Committees were established to provide analysis and reports to the various
Councils.37
This structure was to be managed by a General Secretariat, headed by a
General Secretary. This entity was to coordinate the work of all the other
institutions and was to serve as ALBA’s permanent administrative body. 38
Several conclusions can be drawn from ALBA’s organizational structure.
First, it was extremely large and complex, which would make its many institutions
hard to organize, staff, and coordinate. All but one of these institutions were
advisory only since all decision-making power was to be concentrated in the hands
of the presidents of the member states and they were free to ignore any
recommendations from its Councils. Moreover, ALBA’s organizational structure
seemed to structure ALBA’s goals and operations under its centralized umbrella,
despite the fact that the 2004 and 2006 Declarations appeared to be based on the
primacy of the member states. Furthermore, the Social Movements Council (whose
membership and selection process were not articulated) created an alternate source
of power to that of the member states, since it had the power to create its own
initiatives and transmit them to the Council of President. Lastly, ALBA had no
dispute resolution mechanism to interpret whatever norms it created or to resolve
disputes among its member states or its institutions.

33

2009 Organizational Agreement, supra note 32.
2009 Organizational Agreement, supra note 32. (these were the Political Council, the Social
Council, and the Political Commission).
35
2009 Organizational Agreement, supra note 32. (these included the Economic Council and the
Women’s Council).
36
2009 Organizational Agreement, supra note 32.
37
2009 Organizational Agreement, supra note 32. (these committees included the Work Group on
International Law, Self-Determination and Human Rights, the Defense of Nature Committee, and
the Sovereignty Committee. The latter two were created, but their roles were not clearly defined).
38
2009 Organizational Agreement, supra note 32. (the General Secretariat was to be
headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela).
34
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3. The Peoples’ Commerce Treaty (“TCP”)
Although the 2006 Declaration identified the drafting of the TCP as a
significant priority for ALBA, it is unclear what was intended to be created therein.
Was the TCP meant to create a separate economic integration organization? Was it
instead meant to be an initiative designed to fit into the ALBA organizational
umbrella? What was its mission? How would it be accomplished? The 2006
Declaration said nothing about what the TCP would cover nor how its mission was
to be accomplished.
In 2009, ALBA tried to answer some of these questions by issuing an
additional document listing the fundamental principles that were to be included in
the draft of the TCP treaty (“TCP Fundamental Principles”). 39 The TCP
Fundamental Principles document is simply a list of 23 separate principles that were
supposed to be incorporated into the TCP treaty. These are all more detailed
versions of ALBA’s founding principles, as set forth in the 2004 Declaration. 40 No
specific objective, mission, organization, or purpose for the TCP was articulated
therein or in any other document.
Two of these principles are worth noting. First, the TCP was to recognize
the state as the principal economic actor in all the member states. 41 Second, the TCP
was to recognize and make provisions for the furnishing of basic services to citizens
as a fundamental human right.42 These two principles seem to indicate a preference
for the reshaping of Latin America’s economies into a state-led economic system
concentrating on the provision of basic services rather than on trade. In other words,
the economic development component of ALBA seemed to indicate a return to the
state-led economic policies of the 1950s and 60s.
ALBA issued no further documents indicating what should be included
within a future TCP treaty. Indeed, no draft of a TCP treaty appears to have ever
been produced or agreed upon.
4. Grannational Enterprises
The 2006 Declaration and other documents referred to the term
“Grannational Enterprises” (“GNE”) but did not define it. 43 A 2008 document
sought to define the concept and clarify how these entities were expected to

39

Principios Fundamentaldes del Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos, Oct. 17, 2009 [hereinafter
TCP Fundamental Principles].
40
TCP Fundamental Principles, supra note 39; Catá & Molina, supra note 26, at 688.
41
TCP Fundamental Principles, supra note 39.
42
TCP Fundamental Principles, supra note 39.
43
2006 Declaration, supra note 30; TCP Fundamental Principles, supra note 39.
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function.44 The concept was said to have three goals, one was
historical/political.45The second was socioeconomic.46 Last, the third was
ideological.47 These goals would be achieved by two or more of the ALBA
member states cooperating in individual political, social, economic, scientific, or
industrial projects.48 GNEs were meant to concentrate on the production of goods
and services to satisfy basic human needs of the peoples of the member states,
while taking into account their economic complementarity, and operating based
on solidarity, cooperation, mutual reciprocity, harmony with nature and the
environment, the creation of work, and the equitable distribution of profits. 49 In
essence, GNEs are bi-national mixed state enterprises operating in specified
economic sectors. 50
ALBA did create a number of GNEs. One such example is a joint food
distribution company created by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia,
Honduras, and Dominica.51

44

Proyectos Grannacionales, Bol. – Cuba – Dominica – Ecuador – Haiti – Hond -Nicar.- St.
Vincent.- Venez., https://www.albatcp.org/acta/proyectos-grannacionales/.
45
Id. (this concept sought the creation of a Latin American mega state, based on a common
policy, within the realm of national sovereignty).
46
Id. (this concept sought to create a development strategy meant to satisfy the social needs of all
the peoples of the ALBA member states through joint action).
47
Id. (this concept is based on an opposition to neoliberalism, and instead was aiming at
sustainable development with social justice, self-determination, and national sovereignty).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Maribel Aponte-Garcia, Intra-Regional Trade and Grandnational Enterprises in the Bolivarian
Alliance: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Preliminary Analysis, 3 INT’L J. OF CUBAN
STUD. 181, 182-197 (2011).
51
James Suggett, ALBA Trade Bloc Forms Joint Food Company at Summit in Venezuela,
VENEZUELA ANALYSIS (Feb. 3, 2009), http://venezuelaanalysis.com/news/4165. See also Tratado
Energético del ALBA, art. 5, Apr. 29, 2007, https://portalalba.org/documentos-alba/tratadoenergetico-del-alba [hereinafter ALBA Energy Treaty]; Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
[ALBA], Proyectos Grannacionales [Grannational Projects] (Apr. 28, 2007),
https://portalalba.org/documentos-alba/proyectos-grannacionales; Camille Petersen, Programas de
ALBA-TCP en Bolivia [ALBA-TCP Programs in Bolivia] (Spring 2012) (unpublished paper) (on
file with the University of South Florida School for Independent Study Project Collection,
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2319&context=isp_collection.
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5. The Bank of ALBA
The Bank of ALBA (“Bank”), headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela, was
created in 200852 with an initial investment of $49 billion.53 It was first designed
to finance development programs and projects in key economic sectors of the
ALBA member states, as well as development programs and projects that were
designed to reduce poverty.54 The Bank was also meant to create and administer
special funds for social solidarity and natural disaster aid and was intended to
otherwise function as a financial institution for the benefit of its members. 55
The Bank completed its first transaction in 2010. It served as a payment
clearing system, and its mechanism enabled importers to pay in one currency and
exporters to receive payment in their own currency without the necessity of
engaging in formal currency conversion transactions, thereby preventing
additional conversion costs.56 The Bank’s transactions peaked in 2013 but dropped
precipitously in 2014-15 and never recovered.57 The Bank’s mechanism was
mostly used to finance trade between Venezuela and Ecuador and the collapse of
the Venezuelan economy in 2014-15 put an end to those transactions. 58 In spite of
recent statements by Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro about relaunching it,59
the Bank of ALBA does not seem to be operational at this time.
6. PETROCARIBE and Venezuelan Petro Diplomacy
PETROCARIBE’s relationship to ALBA is hard to understand from an
examination of the former’s constitutive agreement. PETROCARIBE is not
referred to as part of ALBA. The reference to the ALBA-Caribe fund seemed to
imply some sort of a relationship between both entities but did not clarify the
52

Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América-Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos
[ALBA-People’s Trade Treaty], Acta Fundamental del Banco del ALBA [Founding Act of the
Bank of ALBA], Jan. 26, 2008, https://portalalba.org/documentos-alba/acta-fundacional-delbanco-del-alba.
53
See ILICH AGUIRRE ET AL., BANCO CENTRAL DEL ECUADOR, DIAGNÓSTICO DE LOS PROCESOS DE
INTEGRACIÓN EN LATINOAMÉRICA Y EL CARIBE: DOCUMENTO TÉCNICO NO. 06, at 18-19 (2016),
https://www.bce.fin.ec/images/BANCO_C_ECUADOR/PDF/doctec6.pdf.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Stephanie Pearce, The First Five Years of the SUCRE: Successes and Limitations of ALBA’s
Regional Virtual Currency, in UNDERSTANDING ALBA: PROGRESS PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF
ALTERNATIVE REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 74-75 (Asa K. Cusack ed.,
2018).
57
Id. at 75. For example, the Bank’s closed transactions totaled $8 million in 2010, $172 million
in 2011, and $1 billion in 2013.
58
Id. at 78-81.
59
Relanzarán el Banco del ALBA y evaluarán implementación del Petro para intercambio en la
región, LA CORPORACIÓN ECOSOCIALISTA EZEQUIEL ZAMORA (June 11, 2020),
www.corpoez.gob.ve/relanzaran-el-banco-del-alba-y-evaluaran-implementacion-del-petro-paraintercambio-en-la-region.
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specifics of that relationship. Moreover, the PETROCARIBE organization also had
its own Executive Secretariat and Council of Minister, implying that it was a
separate organization from ALBA.
PETROCARIBE was created by an agreement signed at a summit of
Caribbean nations held in 2005 (“PETROCARIBE Agreement”). It was intended
to increase energy security in the Caribbean, correct structural inequalities in the
world hydrocarbons market (which penalized poorer states), and facilitate energy
policies and plans directed to the economic development and integration of
Caribbean states through the equitable use of hydrocarbon supplies. 60
Operationally, the PETROCARIBE Agreement was essentially a
mechanism that provided a template for the sale of Venezuelan oil. First, Venezuela
would create a subsidiary of its state-owned oil company, PDVSA, which would
guarantee oil supplies to the PETROCARIBE member states prices that could be
financed long-term.61 These Venezuelan products could be paid for either in goods
and services or in cash at deeply discounted prices. 62 This entity would also
organize a logistical distribution chain for these products. 63
The PETROCARIBE Agreement also created an ALBA-Caribe Fund,
which would be used for the economic and social development of Caribbean states,
and which would be funded by an initial Venezuelan contribution of $50 million
and future contributions from deferred payments received from oil purchasers. 64
The original signatories to the PETROCARIBE Agreement included, in
addition to Venezuela: Antigua, the Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Chris, St. Vincent, and
Surinam.65 None of these signatories, with the exception of Cuba and Venezuela,
were members of ALBA.
A second agreement signed in 2007 (“2007 PC Agreement”) sought to
reaffirm the concepts described in the PETROCARIBE Agreement and extend its
reach beyond the Caribbean basin. Its provisions were not as specific as those of
the PETROCARIBE Agreement, but its general terms were similar. First,
60

Acuerdo de Cooperación Energética PetroCaribe [PetroCaribe Energy Cooperation
Agreement], June 29, 2005, https://docs.venezuela.justia.com/federales/leyes/ley-aprobatoria-delacuerdo-de-cooperacion-energetica-petrocaribe.pdf, translated in PETROCAROBE ENERGY
COOPERATION AGREEMENT (U. N.M. LA-ENERGAIA PROJECT, ed., 2005) [hereinafter
PETROCARIBE Agreement]; Gustav Cederlöf & Donald V. Kingsbury, On PetroCaribe:
Petropolitics, Energopower, and Post-Neoliberal Development in the Caribbean Energy Region,
72 POL. GEOGRAPHY ELSEVIER 124 (2019).
61
PETROCARIBE Agreement, supra note 60, at art. II, para. 1; at art. IV, para. 2.
62
PETROCARIBE Agreement, supra note 60, at art. IV.
63
PETROCARIBE Agreement, supra note 60, at art. III, para. 5.
64
PETROCARIBE Agreement, supra note 60, at art. II.
65
PETROCARIBE Agreement, supra note 60, at art. VI.

12

20:2

2022

Santa Clara Journal of International Law
operations described under the 2007 PC Agreement would be run by the same
PDVSA subsidiary that ran the original agreement.66 Furthermore, Venezuela
would supply oil to the agreement signatories under discounted terms. In turn, they
would agree on initiatives to supply gas and to work on the expansion of
hydroelectric and other renewable sources of energy.67 Moreover, mixed binational
enterprises would be created to develop petroleum refining infrastructure, as well
as storage and distribution facilities and electric generation plants. 68
The 2017 PC Agreement was signed by some, but not all, of the signatories
of the original PETROCARIBE Agreement. They were Belize, Cuba, Dominica,
Grenada, Haiti, Nicaragua, St. Vincent, Surinam, and Venezuela. 69
At the same time, ALBA seemed to be creating a competitor to
PETROCARIBE. In 2007, ALBA entered into an energy treaty (“AE Treaty”),
signed by Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, that was meant to create
hydrocarbon infrastructure among the ALBA member states. 70 In this treaty,
Venezuela gave the signatory states access to a portion of its oil reserves, whose
exploration and exploitation would be undertaken by a Grannational Enterprise,
which would be known as Petro ALBA.71 The AE Treaty, in language very similar
to that of the PETROCARIBE Treaty,72 also provided that ALBA would foster the
development of initiatives to permit the exploitation of gas reserves and the creation
of alternative sources of energy. 73
In fact, the PETROCARIBE and AE treaties seem to have almost identical
language with one exception: the AE Treaty expressly states that the arrangements
and relationships created therein form part of ALBA, while the PETROCARIBE
Treaty does not.74 To add to the confusion, ALBA and PETROCARIBE have
interacted with each other and have held joint summits.75 Furthermore, it appears
that some ALBA members obtained their subsidized supplies of Venezuelan
hydrocarbon products through PETROCARIBE, while some obtained their
supplies through Petro ALBA. Cuba, on the other hand, despite being part of both
66

See Tratado de Seguridad Energética PetroCaribe [PetroCaribe Energy Security Treaty], Aug.
11, 2007, http://www.granma.cu/granmad/secciones/petrocaribe/que-es/que-3.html [hereinafter
2007 PC Agreement].
67
See 2007 PC Agreement, supra note 66.
68
2007 PC Agreement, supra note 66, at art. III; Cederlöf, supra note 60, at 129.
69
2007 PC Agreement, supra note 66.
70
ALBA Energy Treaty, supra note 51.
71
ALBA Energy Treaty, supra note 51, at art. II, para. 1.
72
Compare 2007 PC Agreement, supra note 66 with ALBA Energy Treaty, supra note 51.
73
ALBA Energy Treaty, supra note 51.
74
See supra notes 64 and 68 and accompanying text.
75
Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe, EVOLUCIÓN DEL ACUERDO DE
COOPERACIÓN ENERGÉTICA [Latin American and Caribbean Economic System, Evolution of the
Energy Cooperation Agreement], June 2015,
http://www.granma.cu/granmad/secciones/petrocaribe/que-es/que-3.html.
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PETROCARIBE and Petro ALBA, obtained its Venezuelan hydrocarbon supplies
through a different bilateral 2000 agreement with Venezuela. 76
Why create several organizations with the same goals? It appears that both
PETROCARIBE and Petro ALBA, rather than representing potentially competing
organizations, merely represented a series of individual transactions entered into by
Venezuela, designed to use its own oil wealth to increase its political and economic
influence in the Caribbean and to attempt to counter any political or economic
United States intervention in the region.77
At this point, both PETROCARIBE and Petro ALBA are out of business 78
because the major decrease in the price of crude oil and the collapse of the
Venezuelan oil industry in 2014 have resulted in making these transactions
logistically impossible and economically unattractive. Venezuela simply cannot
afford to subsidize foreign oil sales anymore, and its customers can obtain better
terms elsewhere.79
The collapse of PETROCARIBE and Petro ALBA has also left its
participants with a massive problem. The hydrocarbon supplies sold at a discount
under these arrangements were financed by Venezuela through long-term, lowinterest loans. The purchasers are now saddled with billions of dollars in debt that
most of them cannot afford to pay back. Even if some of these purchasers were in
a position to repay these loans, they would be unable to do so because United States
sanctions imposed on Venezuela would make it impossible to route these payments
to Venezuelan banks.80 These purchasers are therefore stuck in an untenable
situation: owing considerable sums of money for past petroleum imports which
can’t be repaid.
7. An Assessment
ALBA represented a political and ideological response to the economic
neoliberalism that took hold in Latin America in the 1980s. It sought to foster Latin
American resistance to the United States and global multinational organizations, as
well as economic emancipation from the global international trade system. Its basis
was political, rather than economic.81

76

Id. at 8.
Cederlöf, supra note 60, at 125.
78
Cederlöf, supra note 60, at 59. At this point, it appears that only Cuba, through a series of barter
transactions, is receiving Venezuelan oil supplies.
79
Cederlöf, supra note 60.
80
Cederlöf, supra note 60.
81
Asa K. Cusack, Pragmatism Left, Right, and Centre? Revisiting ALBA Accession in the
Eastern Caribbean 115 (Asa K. Cusack, ed., 2018); Castro Speech, supra note 21; Rosalba
Linares, The Alba Alliance and the Construction of a New Latin American Regionalism, 3.2 & 3.3
77
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ALBA also rested on a socialist vision of the state and of economic
development, which placed principal emphasis on the role of the state as the main
engine of economic activity.82 This state control of both national and supranational
economic interactions implied a return to an import substitution and command
economy model,83 as well as the nationalization or renationalization of natural
resources.84 At the national level, economic growth would be the endogenous result
of an economic system whose principal goal is the elimination of poverty and
inequality.85 At the transnational level, this approach sought horizontal integration
among its members, which would create a more democratic and multipolar world
order.86 Horizontal integration would result in an alliance of like-minded states
where goods and services would not be exchanged for profit, but instead according
to the capacities and needs of the parties. 87
ALBA’s model was an attractive idea in 2006 partly as a result of left-wing
candidates winning presidential elections in Latin America. 88 Moreover, for
countries struggling with poverty and inequality, ALBA’s new ideas highlighting
non-profit making trade focusing on social development and cooperation, rather
than economic competition, seemed like a breath of fresh air. 89
Unfortunately, several problems arose within ALBA that undermined these
goals and threatened its growth. As we have seen, one of ALBA’s principal
proponents was Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. In Venezuela, his
administration created a parallel economy in which ownership of social goods and
products technically owned by the state were meant to be controlled by the
community and used for its benefit. Under this model, mass popular organizations
were given the power to use state resources for the elimination of inequality and
the equalization of wealth without regard to economic norms and without any
coordination or supervision. ALBA imported this model through its Social
Movements Council, which had direct access to its decision-makers. The problem
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CUBAN STUDIES 145, 150 (2011),
http://cubanstudies.plutojournals.org.
82
See generally Helen Yaffe, Cuban Development: Inspiration for the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas (ALBA), 15.2 JOURNAL OF IBERIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH 145, 151 (2009);
Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant and The Crisis of the State: Four
Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 BERKELEY LA
RAZA LJ. 141, pincite (2006); Maribel Aponte-Garcia, Intra-regional Trade and Grandnational
Enterprises in the Bolivarian Alliance: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Preliminary
Analysis, 3.2 & 3.3 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CUBAN STUDIES 181, pincite (2011).
83
Catá Backer, supra note 82.
84
Christopher David Absell, Self-Awareness and Critique: An Overview of ALBA Research, in
UNDERSTANDING ALBA: THE PROGRESS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF ALTERNATIVE
REGIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 13 (Asa K. Cusack, ed., 2018).
85
Aponte-Garcia, supra note 82.
86
Hirst, supra note 1.
87
Cole - Progress, supra note 2, at 116.
88
Cusack, supra note 81.
89
Yaffe, supra note 82; Cusack, supra note 81.
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here was that under ALBA, the state was meant to be the principal actor and
coordinator in national economies and regional integration. In the Social
Movements Council, ALBA created a powerful rival to siphon off economic
resources for other uses at a regional level. This contradiction also undermined the
member states’ sovereignty and undermined the main engine of integration of
ALBA’s model: the state.90
ALBA, like many other Latin American integration organizations
(regardless of ideology) sowed the seeds of its own decline by failing to create any
real supranational institutions or structure, which would have engendered an
institutional framework and personality, and which would have implemented its
agenda. It was, instead, an entity whose agenda, decisions, and actions depended
exclusively on the consensus of the presidents of its member states. The tradition
of strong inter-presidential dynamics in Latin America made it too prone to the
national agendas and personalities of these leaders. ALBA, therefore, became a
creature of presidential summitry where any action was dependent on the
congruence of the agendas of the leaders attending the summit and their willingness
to implement its decisions. A failure of the presidents to agree would result in no
action. Moreover, ALBA’s lack of a dispute resolution mechanism made it, in my
opinion, impossible for it to enforce any norms it created.
Additionally, ALBA’s emphasis on using trade and financial resources
principally to aid the poor was unlikely to attract the participation of the wealthier
countries in Latin America, such as Brazil, Chile, or Mexico, since they would be
expected to be the principal sources of finance for its projects. Despite their wealth
in comparison to many others, these countries also had pressing needs to finance
within their own borders.91 Moreover, President Chavez’s foreign policy actions
alienated many potential allies and turned them into opponents, and sometimes
even resulted in the election of national leaders who were hostile to ALBA and its
ideology.92 So, ALBA became a small conglomeration of poor countries relying on
the largess of its largest and wealthiest member, Venezuela. 93

90

Yaffe, supra note 82; Cusack, supra note 81.
Cusack, supra note 81.
92
Olivier Dabène, Professor, Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po), Paper delivered at
the 2012 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Panel “Waves of change in
Latin America. History and Politics”: Explaining Latin America’s Fourth Wave of Regionalism
(May 25, 2012) at 44-45. These actions included:
● Venezuelan interference in the 2006 Mexican presidential elections, which created
Mexican hostility to Chavez, Venezuela, and any of its initiatives;
● a quarrel between Venezuela and Brazil in 2007 resulted in Brazil blocking a number of
ALBA initiatives, such as the Bank of the South and PETROSUR;
● Venezuela’s interference with the Peruvian 2006 presidential election, which resulted in
the election of Alan García, a conservative candidate. Mr. García looked at steering Peru
to alternative political and economic coalitions, including signing a Free Trade
Agreement with the United States.
93
Cusak, supra note 81, at 220-21.
91
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Moreover, the implementation of ALBA’s agenda was irregular and uneven
at best. For example, only some of the Grannational enterprises and agreed upon
projects ever got off the ground and, since the economies of many of the member
states did not perform as expected, these members needed to rely on the private
sector, rather than the state, for crucial financing.94 Moreover, no People’s
Commerce Treaty was ever drafted or signed, and the Bank of the ALBA never
seems to have gone beyond serving as an intermediary for Venezuelan funds. These
failures gave ALBA a reputation for creating grandiose plans while lacking the
internal coherence and competence to implement them. In other words, ALBA was
all talk and no action.95 This image did not help ALBA, since it faced a substantial
amount of competition from other Latin American integration organizations such
as the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. All these institutions were in essence
competing for members and influence. Since neither the presidents nor the
governments of the nations of Latin America had the time or assets to participate
in all institutions, they had to choose which one would most benefit their interests.
For the reasons discussed above, ALBA was not an attractive candidate.
8. The End of ALBA
After the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013, Venezuela’s economy took a
nosedive because of economic mismanagement and a drastic decline in the
worldwide price of crude oil. Thus, it could no longer serve as ALBA’s paymaster,
and remittances to its member states dried out. Moreover, Chavez’s successor as
president, Nicolás Maduro, has shown no interest in making ALBA one of his
priorities. As a result, Bolivia and Ecuador left ALBA to join MERCOSUR. The
remaining member states do not seem to have the resources, interest, or clout to
operate ALBA or to move its priorities forward. As of today, ALBA is essentially
defunct.
II.

UNASUR: THE INTEGRATION SUPERMARKET
A. Introduction

In this section, I shall examine and evaluate UNASUR’s origins, mission,
organization and structures, institutions, achievements, and challenges, as well as
its ultimate failure.
A second entity that arose from regional discontent with the neoliberal
integration model was the Union of South American Nations (“UNASUR”).
UNASUR arose from an agreement between the member states of MERCOSUR
and the Andean Community and was meant to expand the economic models
espoused by these organizations. UNASUR’s planned agenda and model would
cover political coordination, infrastructure integration, scientific and technological
94
95

Cusak, supra note 81, at 221-24.
Cusak, supra note 81, at 221-24.
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cooperation, and regional development, in addition to economic and trade
integration.96 In fact, it was modeled after the European Union and sought to
establish full economic, political, and monetary unity in South America. 97
UNASUR, like ALBA, failed in achieving its goals and is essentially defunct.
B. The Origins of UNASUR
As noted above, UNASUR arose out of a series of meetings among a
number of the member states of both the Andean Community and MERCOSUR.
As early as 2004, at a meeting in Cusco, Perú, the countries in attendance
contemplated the development of a new “integrated space” which would, in
addition to embracing and deepening the agenda of the Andean Community and
MERCOSUR, include political, social, and economic cooperation and
coordination. This “new space” would deepen the economic links that already
existed among those countries.98 In other words, UNASUR would recharge the
Andean Community and MERCOSUR models of economic integration and expand
regional integration into other, non-economic areas.
A year later, the same countries sought to concretize the characteristics of
the new organization, described previously, by creating a working plan for its
creation. This working plan was based on six different concepts: the coordination
of foreign policy; the deepening of the MERCOSUR and Andean Community
agreements; the development of physical and energy integration; the creation of
common development policies, especially in agriculture and food production;
cooperation in the technological, scientific, and political realms; and the integration
of social and civil groups.99
A series of meetings followed, where work implementing these agreedupon concepts continued.100 By May of 2008, an agreement was reached on a
formal treaty, and UNASUR was born.
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Fernando Ferrari-Filho, A Regional Arrangement Proposal for the UNASUR, 34 BRAZ. J. OF
POL. ECON., No. 3 (136) 413, 415 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-31572014000300004.
97
Eric Mosinger, Integration at the Summit: UNASUR and the Politics of Presidential Authority,
in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION ANNUAL CONVENTION, MONTREAL, QUEBEC, CANADA
at 1 (2011) [hereinafter Mosinger].
98
Declaración de Cusco sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones, III Cumbre
Presidencial Sudamericana (2004),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/200/200412/20041216_03_d.
pdf.
99
See Reunión de las Secretarías Técnicas de las Instituciones Regionales y Subregionales de la
Comunidad Sud Americana de Naciones, Bases Para un Plan de Trabajo Conjunto Document
SG/di 789 (2013), http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos/DInformativos/SGdi759.doc.
100
See Documento Final de la Comisión Estratégica de Reflexión: Un Nuevo Modelo de
Integración de América del Sur-Hacia la Unión Sudamericana de Naciones (2006),
http://www.iirsa.org/admin_iirsa_web/Uploads/Documents/rp_cochabamba06_csn_documento_fi
nal_comision_estrategica_de_reflexion.pdf; Declaración de Cochabamba-Colocando la Piedra
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C. UNASUR’s Mission, Organization, and Structure
1. UNASUR’s Mission
The treaty creating UNASUR lists an overwhelmingly broad and
overarching mission for the organization (“UNASUR Treaty”). They include
“creating, in a broad and consensual manner, social economic and political
integration” among its member states “in order to eliminate socio-economic
inequality, achieve social inclusion and citizen participation, strengthen democracy
and strengthen their sovereignty and independence.”101 This broad mission was
then further supplemented by twenty-one specific goals covering every conceivable
area of potential cooperation among the member states. 102 UNASUR’s to-do list
was enormous and, in my view, probably unachievable.
At its zenith, UNASUR’s member states included: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Paraguay, Perú, Surinam,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.103

Fundamental para una Unión Suramericana (2006),
http://www.iirsa.org/admin_iirsa_web/Uploads/Documents/rp_cochabamba06_csn_declaracion_d
e_cochabamba.pdf.
101
Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas art. 2 (2008),
http://www.iirsa.org/admin_iirsa_web/Uploads/Documents/rp_brasilia08_cumbre_unasur_tratado
_constitutivo.pdf. [hereinafter Tratado UNASUR].
102
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art. 3. These specific goals included:
● strengthening political dialogue;
● social and human development with equity and inclusion in order to eradicate poverty and
overcome the inequities present in the region;
● energy integration;
● Infrastructure development;
● financial integration;
● protection of biodiversity;
● development of concrete and effective mechanisms for the overcoming of asymmetries;
● consolidation of a South American identity;
● universal access to social security and health services;
● cooperation in migration;
● economic and commercial cooperation;
● industrial and production integration;
● the definition and implementation of common projects in research and innovation;
● promotion of cultural diversity;
● citizen participation;
● coordination among specialized institutions;
● judicial cooperation;
● exchange of defense information;
● cooperation in the strengthening of citizen security; and
● sectoral cooperation.
103
Ferrari-Filho, supra note 96, at 420-421.
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2. UNASUR’s Institutions
UNASUR’s ambitious agenda was meant to be achieved through the work
of four principal institutions: the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign
Ministers, The Council of Delegates, and the Secretary General. 104
As was the case with ALBA, all policy and decision-making authority in
UNASUR resided in the Council of Heads of State, which was set to meet once a
year.105 The Council of Foreign Ministers were mostly involved, as a body, in
formulating and coordinating proposals for consideration by the Council of Heads
of State, or in implementing its decisions. Two major exceptions included their
power to decide on the yearly budget and on the financing of common projects. 106
The Council of Delegates formulated detailed proposals for the Council of Foreign
Ministers to consider, and to further implement the decisions of the Council of
Heads of State.107 Lastly, the Secretary General and his staff were charged with
preparing for and rendering administrative support to all of the other institutions,
preparing administrative regulations, and preparing a draft budget for approval by
the Council of Foreign Ministers.108
As was the case with ALBA, several operational issues affected
UNASUR’s institutions from the very start and made the possibility of concerted
action unlikely. First, all decision-making power rested in the hands of the heads of
states of its members, which met infrequently. As seen in our discussion on ALBA,
if the heads of state failed to reach a consensus on a particular subject (for any
reason, including lack of interest), then UNASUR would be unable to act.
Moreover, all of UNASUR’s institutions were required to operate by consensus,
again making it extremely hard for any of these institutions to agree on specific
recommendations or actions since an objection from a single member state could
derail a proposal.109
Furthermore, the effectiveness of any policies or decisions was also
severely hampered in two different ways. First, the treaty provided that any member
state could be totally or partially exempted from any policy or decision made by
UNASUR.110 In practice, this would mean that any member state could, in
104

Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art. 4. A fifth institution, the President Pro-Tem, was
meant to rotate in alphabetical order among the member states on a yearly basis. Its function
appears to be purely ceremonial. Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art. 7. The Treaty also
mentions the creation of a South American Parliament, but this institution was never created.
105
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 6.
106
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 8. They are to meet twice a year.
107
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 9. They are to meet six times a year.
108
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 10.
109
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 12. The Treaty defines consensus as the approval of
¾ of the member states, even if they are not present at the meeting where the decision or
recommendation was being discussed. Id.
110
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 13.
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exchange for its agreement to approve any policy it did not like, seek a total or
partial exemption from its coverage. Lastly, UNASUR’s norms were essentially
unenforceable because the Treaty did not provide for any enforcement mechanism
to deal with member states’ non-compliance. Similarly, the UNASUR Treaty
provided no dispute resolution mechanism to resolve issues involving the
organization or its member states or to interpret any norms that they might create. 111
3. UNASUR’s Specialized Agencies
The UNASUR Treaty provided for the creation of permanent or temporary
specialized agencies.112 With one exception, all these agencies were not specifically
mentioned in the treaty but were instead created by a decision from the Council of
Heads of State.113
UNASUR’s specialized agencies included the Energy Council, 114 the South
American Defense Council,115 the Economic and Financial Council, 116 and the
Infrastructure Council.117 In this section, we will examine them individually and
assess them collectively.
i.

The Energy Council

As early as May 2008, the Energy Council adopted a strategy and plan of
action for energy integration that included proposals for action in several areas,
such as the extraction and delivery of energy, the development of biofuels, the use
of public/private ventures, the protection of the environment, the use of alternative
energy sources, universal and non-discriminatory access to energy for all, and the

111

Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 21. According to the Treaty, any disputes (whether
among the member states or between a member state and UNASUR) were to be resolved by direct
negotiations among the parties. If negotiations were unsuccessful, then first the Council of
Delegates or then the Council of Foreign Ministers could recommend a solution of the dispute to
the parties.
112
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 5.
113
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 5. The one exception was the South American
Energy Council, which was specifically mentioned in the Treaty.
114
Tratado UNASUR, supra note 101, at art 5.
115
UNASUR Decisión para el Establecimiento del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano de
UNASUR (2008),
https://www5.pucsp.br/ecopolitica/downloads/seguranca/Decision_Consejo_Defesa_Suramerican
o_2008.pdf [hereinafter Decisión Est CDS].
116
UNASUR, Consejo Suramericano de Economía y Finanzas, Estatutos,
https://studylib.es/doc/4590370/estatuto-consejo-suramericano-de-econom%C3%ADa-y-finanzas
[hereinafter Estatuto Consejo Economía].
117
UNASUR, Consejo Surameriano de Infraestructura y Planeamiento, Estatutos (2009),
http://www.iirsa.org/admin_iirsa_web/Uploads/Documents/cosiplan_estatuto.pdf [hereinafter
Estatuto Consejo Infraestructura].
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relationship between energy and food production.118 The latter proposals gave
these plans an innovative social dimension.119
Three of these proposals for action (energy extraction and delivery, biofuels, and
public/private ventures) placed UNASUR in direct competition with ALBA’s
energy policy and entities, which were pursuing proposals in the same areas. 120
These competing proposals could become very problematic since ALBA and
UNASUR shared member states.
By May 2010, the Council’s working group began work on a draft of the
South American Energy Treaty.121 Despite several additional meetings, no treaty
draft was ever created. In fact, the Council seemed to recognize that this proposed
treaty would duplicate work already being performed by ALBA.122 This may have
been a recognition of a weakness in both ALBA’s and UNASUR’s energy policy:
the dependence on Venezuelan oil production and capital to finance these ventures.
When Venezuela’s oil industry imploded after the death of President Chávez, any
thoughts of energy integration within UNASUR may have, I believe, essentially
died with him.123
In fact, a comparison of the work of the Energy Council with that of
PETROCARIBE leads to the conclusion that they were both Venezuelan energy
“deals,” meant to exchange subsidized hydrocarbon products for political
influence.124
ii.

The South American Defense Council

The South American Defense Council (“SADC”) was established in
December of 2008 and sought to coordinate defense policy, increase Latin
American cooperation on humanitarian and peace operations, and establish and
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Estructura del Tratado Energético Suramericano (May 4, 2010),
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.
123
Bilotta, supra note 2.
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coordinate technological & industrial policy in the defense sector. 125 These
objectives were to be based on the principles of nonintervention and territorial
integrity of all participating states.126 The Council created a plan of action that
stressed these goals, as well as joint training and operational cooperation among its
military forces.127
By 2011, the plan of action was expanded to include the creation of a South
American military training aircraft, as well as the creation of a South American
registry of defense expenditures. 128 The plans for building and designing this
training aircraft did not come to fruition, partially because this project ran counter
to extensive defense and aviation programs underway in Brazil, and no South
American registry of defense expenditures was ever established. 129
A major impediment to the progress of the SADC’s plans may have been
the lack of basic commonality among the defense establishment of its member
states. This included different conceptions by the member states of the functions
and missions of the armed forces; the role of the armed forces in society; and
different military organizations, equipment, and training. 130
After some initial successes in the establishment of cooperative links in
some security and defense issues, the plans and agenda of the SADC stalled and
were not realized.
iii.

The Economic and Finance Council

The Economic and Finance Council (“EFC”) was created in 2010 and like
many of its agency counterparts, had an extensive and broad set of objectives and
goals in its portfolio. These goals covered almost all possible issues related to
finance, capital, and markets.131 The EFC established working groups to craft
125
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AND ANALYSES, 2 (Oct. 30, 2012),
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Lima (Nov. 10-11, 2011), https://www.yumpu.com/es/document/read/22920115/ii-declaracion-delima.
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specific proposals to implement these goals. These proposals sought to reduce the
vulnerability of the countries of South America to the fluctuation of foreign
markets and to promote economic and social development. 132
Further meetings took place, and despite specific proposals from several
member states,133 all the EFC decided was to continue studying the issues
identified in its action plan.134It appeared that the EFC never did anything else. As
was the case with other UNASUR Councils, the EFC repeatedly discussed broad
and ambitious plans but never moved towards implementing any of them.
iv.

The Infrastructure and Planning Council

The Infrastructure and Planning Council (“IPC”) was also created in 2009
to develop an infrastructure for regional integration, stimulate regional cooperation
in planning and infrastructure, promote the compatibility of current infrastructure,
and promote the execution of priority infrastructure projects. 135 These objectives
were to be reached in accordance with stated principles of complementarity,
solidarity, and cooperation among the member states.136 Again, the IPC does not

●
●

promoting central bank coordination in the management of reserves;
considering the creation of coordination mechanisms of available financial funds, in order to
obtain the financing of regional integration and development projects;
● the development of a South American financial and capitals market;
● the exploration of the development of policies and mechanisms to monitor capital flow;
● developing a mechanism to protect the Latin American region from international market
fluctuations;
● the coordination of macroeconomic policies;
● ensuring that social and human development is equitable;
● constructing an economic system with, equity, social justice, and harmony with nature;
● creating a system of growth and development which overcomes asymmetries;
● creating financial integration through the adoption of mechanisms compatible with the fiscal
and economic policies of the member states;
● engaging in economic and commercial cooperation; and
● engaging in sectoral cooperation. Id.
132
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region. UNASUR, Declaración de la II Reunión del Consejo Suramericano de Economía y
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seem to have generated any specific proposals to achieve the objectives. It, too,
seems to have grandiose plans, but no achievements.
v.

An Assessment

Examination of UNASUR’s specialized agencies reveals that they all
seemed to share three broad characteristics. First, they were created at about the
same time (2008-2009) and their charters enumerated many extremely broad and
ambitious specific goals These goals were indeterminate and hard to quantify and
seemed to cover any possible issue that may arise in the agencies’ areas of concern.
Many of the issues encompassed by these goals involved the solution of difficult
and intractable problems, and it is hard to imagine how one particular agency could
have resolved them. Second, although they held many meetings, created
workgroups, and detailed action plans to study potential ways of implementing their
goals, the specialized agencies rarely discussed specifics. Third, none of these
specialized agencies ever produced or enforced any specific plans or projects to
implement goals. In short, all of UNASUR’s specific agencies discussed grand
plans, but, after failing to come up with or implement specific solutions to the
problems that they were discussing, achieved nothing.
4. UNASUR’s Achievements and Challenges
From 2008 to 2010, UNASUR achieved some political success by serving
as a rather successful mediator in several political crises, including an internal
political crisis in Bolivia, conflicts between Bolivia and Colombia, protecting
Ecuador’s sovereign rights against United Kingdom interference, and monitoring
the democratic process in countries like Guyana. 137
This promising start, however, gave way to a series of challenges that made
it very difficult for UNASUR to function, and in the end, caused its demise. As was
the case with ALBA, the principal problem facing UNASUR was the concentration
of its power and decision-making authority in the hands of the presidents of its
member states.138 Thus, UNASUR’s approach to policymaking and crisis
●

gradual and flexible implementation, which recognizes national diversity, of agreed upon
infrastructure projects; and
● solidarity and cooperation in the evaluation and prioritization of infrastructure projects. Id.
137
Pothuraju, supra note 126, at 1; FRANCISCO E. THOUMI, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED
CRIME ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA (Friederich-Ebert-Stift, 2010); Nataniel
Parish Flannery, Can South America Become the New European Union?, FORBES, (Nov. 12,
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(F. Laursen ed., 2003).
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resolution was through presidential summits, rather than through the development
of consistent and sustainable policies arrived at by the participation of other actors,
both national and supranational. 139 The UNASUR experience shows that
presidential policymaking works only as long as there is agreement and consensus
among the principals of the organization about vision, goals, and policies 140.
In the case of UNASUR, two of the major participants of its creation,
Brazilian President Lula da Silva of Brazil and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez,
had vastly different visions of Latin American integration (capitalist vs. socialist)
as well as different attitudes towards Latin America’s relationship with the United
States,141 with the latter favoring confrontation and the former favoring
coexistence.142 Moreover, conflicting strategic interests among the member states
also made agreements among the UNASUR presidents more difficult. 143 If the
presidents could not agree, then UNASUR could not act.
This presidential model of decision-making in UNASUR was also
problematic for several other reasons. First, because the UNASUR presidents
generally served as the principal source of domestic power and policymaking, 144
their priority was the resolution of domestic issues. Consequently, they would have
little time to dedicate to UNASUR business. They also tended to be reactive rather
than proactive, and more inclined to spend their time making broad policy
pronouncements rather than analyzing specific policy details. Since UNASUR’s
institutional model refused to allocate any policymaking authority to any of its
supranational institutions, this lack of authority prevented the organization from
reaching a consensus on specific goals and decisions, and, most importantly,
implementing decisions they had already reached. 145 As noted above, UNASUR’s
lack of a mechanism for interpreting or enforcing its norms and resolving disputes
among its members made it extremely hard to enforce any of its decisions or
norms.146
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In an organization such as ALBA or UNASUR, member state participation
and engagement would be dependent on what advantages the state perceived that it
could gain from membership (such as enlarged markets, complementarity of
neighboring economies, and global negotiating power) and at what cost. 147 In other
words, in order to encourage the participation of its members and compliance with
its norms, UNASUR needed to focus on the goals and values that its members
wanted to achieve in order to arrive at specific projects which gathered a consensus
of support, which would encourage them to continue and enlarge their participation
in the joint enterprise.148 Most importantly, UNASUR had to produce; it had to
successfully complete these projects in order to encourage additional participation
and compliance. As we have seen, unfortunately, UNASUR was unable to do this.
As previously noted, UNASUR’s plans and goals were very broad and
ambitious.149 Several problems made these goals hard to achieve. First, UNASUR’s
lack of institutions with the authority to plan, agree upon, and implement specific
projects and its overreliance on presidential summits made it extremely hard for the
organization to make any plans or complete any projects. Second, the economies of
UNASUR’s member states were quite asymmetrical. Some UNASUR member
states had highly developed economies, with extensive infrastructure, trade, and
substantial available capital, while others had extremely underdeveloped
economies, with little infrastructure or capital and great economic needs. 150 This
situation created great demand from the former for capital and assistance for aiding
projects of the latter. The more developed member states were expected to provide
the capital and assistance for UNASUR projects. However, even the most
developed member states had substantial needs and limited resources, which made
them reluctant to spend significant amounts of their resources on foreign aid when
these funds could be used to resolve urgent domestic needs. The substantial lack of
basic infrastructure facilities among many of UNASUR’s poorer members would
require massive amounts of investment in order to generate increased development
and trade, and these projects would be very hard to finance. 151
5. The End of UNASUR
Several factors were responsible for the failure of UNASUR as an
organization. First, the world economic crisis of 2008 generated great damage to
the economies of Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela, forcing their governments
147
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to focus their efforts on resolving domestic crises. They simply did not have the
time, resources, or inclination to support transnational development projects such
as those suggested by UNASUR.152
Furthermore, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, one of UNASUR’s
principal proponents and supporters both politically and financially, died in March
of 2013, leaving Venezuela in a state of political and economic crisis. 153 In addition,
between 2015 and 2017, the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were
replaced by ideological and political conservatives, creating a major ideological
division in UNASUR154. This ideological divide caused many disagreements and
conflicts among its members.155 These became so extreme that UNASUR was
unable to elect a Secretary General for several months. 156
These ideological battles, along with UNASUR’s lack of concrete
achievements, resulted in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru
leaving the organization in April of 2018157 and Uruguay leaving in 2020158.
Many reasons have been proposed for the ultimate demise of UNASUR.
One critic described it as “a talking head without an institutional body, a platform
for speeches and photo opportunities with no real work since its goals were more
aspirational than real.”159 This lack of institutions made it impossible for it to
achieve consensus on basic goals and values, rendering it useless. 160 Along the
same lines, another critic described UNASUR as a presidents’ club 161 which was
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more interested in political pronouncements rather than in providing solutions to
concrete problems.162

CONCLUSION
The failure of ALBA and UNASUR to achieve their goals, or even survive,
underscores several important lessons for integration organizations.
First, ALBA and UNASUR show us that founding a regional integration
organization on the basis of a particular theory of economic development is not a
good idea. The survival of such an organization must depend on the successful
application and implementation of the theory to the realities on the ground. As
discussed above, the different economic development theories that have been
applied in Latin America since the end of World War II have lost support and
credibility because they all failed to achieve their promises. 163 If the organization’s
implementation of its basic theory fails to achieve results, then it will lose
credibility, support, and membership. The organization fails if its ideological base
fails. More importantly, membership in such an organization requires that all the
governments of its member states support its ideological basis. This limits growth,
since states whose leadership does not support the organization’s basic ideology
will not join. Moreover, as seen with both ALBA and UNASUR, the organization's
ability to function is hampered when new governments who do not support this
basic ideology come to office, and member states will either not cooperate or leave
the organization.
Second, placing all decision-making power and authority in an integration
organization in the hands of the presidents of the member states, as was done with
both ALBA and UNASUR, is also not a recipe for success. As we have noted above,
because of the presidentialist style of government common in Latin America, heads
of state face many urgent domestic issues on a daily basis.164 They may also be
involved in rivalries with other states. The presidents will not have much time, in a
once-a-year meeting, to do more than agree on some “big picture” policies. In that
case, who will make all the operational decisions that the organization will need in
order to implement these policies? Because no other institutions within the
organization have the power to make these operational decisions on a timely basis,
the answer is no one. Lastly, both ALBA and UNASUR appeared to require that
their member state presidents act by a supermajority or by consensus. 165 When such
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a consensus cannot be reached for any reason, the institution is paralyzed, and
nothing happens.
Third, an integration organization must, in order to survive and thrive, be
able to point to a track record of specific achievements. Clearly, states will
participate in the work of, or remain in, an international organization only if they
see concrete benefits arising out of their membership.166 They will want to see their
investment in time and treasure yield some benefit to them within a reasonable
period. This was a major problem for both ALBA and UNASUR. They spent years
creating broad and vague plans that would be very hard to implement within a
reasonable time and never devised any workable implementation strategies. In
short, ALBA and UNASUR over-promised and under-performed. They would have
been better served by setting smaller, more achievable goals at the beginning, which
would have allowed their member states to cooperate with each other and build
trust in the organization.
Fourth, in order to be able to achieve their goals, regional integration
organizations must have an effective institutional structure. That is a structure
where separate supranational institutions with clear areas of competence and
authority work together to formulate the organizational agenda, implement its
programs, and ensure that its norms are complied with by the member states. It is
through their participation in the appropriate institutions where representatives of
the member states and supranational civil servants can suggest plans, lobby,
negotiate, and agree on plans and projects. This participation also creates trust in
the organization. These institutions are also the ones charged with the
implementation of these projects: they oversee the operational issues required to do
so. They also monitor compliance with the organization’s norms. In order for this
institutional structure to be effective, it must be granted sufficient authority (both
internally by the organization and externally by its member states) to achieve its
mission. Neither ALBA nor UNASUR had such a structure.
Lastly, experience shows that disputes regarding the interpretation of, or
compliance with, an integration organization’s norms between an integration
organization and a member state, or between member states, are likely to arise. In
order to resolve these disputes, the organization must have a functional dispute
resolution and enforcement mechanism. Both ALBA and UNSAUR had no dispute
resolution or enforcement mechanism. Thus, it would have been unable to resolve
these disputes.
For all of these reasons, both ALBA and UNASUR were doomed to fail.
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